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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kenneth Wayne Lamb appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty
plea to lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 16. Lamb contends his
sentence is excessive and that the district court erred in failing to order a
psychological evaluation even though he specifically declined to request one.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Thirteen-year-old

A.K.

was treated

at an

emergency

room

after

complaining of nausea and vomiting over the previous week. (PSI, p.2.) The
attending physician found that A.K. was eight weeks pregnant. (Id.) Both A.K.
and her step-father, Lamb, disclosed to the physician that Lamb was the father.
(Id.) Law enforcement officers responded to the hospital and spoke with A.K.
and Lamb. (Id.) Lamb admitted to the officers that he had engaged in sexual
intercourse with A.K. between three times a week and daily over the previous
several months, usually early in the morning while everyone else in the family
was asleep. (Id.) A.K. later disclosed to her mother that the abuse began when
she was seven years old. (PSI, p.3.) The state charged Lamb with lewd and
lascivious conduct with a minor under 16. (R., pp.16-17.)
While Lamb was detained at the Canyon County Jail after his arrest,
officers were alerted to an escape conspiracy involving Lamb.

(PSI, pp.2-3.)

Lamb and two other suspects planned to use a shower head to bludgeon a
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deputy, steal his keys and radio, and then escape from the jail. (Id.) Lamb was
confronted and admitted the allegations.

(Id.)

The state charged Lamb with

conspiracy to commit felony escape. (PSI, p.3.)
Lamb pied guilty to both lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under 16
and conspiracy to commit felony escape. (Tr., p.13, L.1 - p.25, L.19.) On the
lewd and lascivious conduct charge, the district court imposed a unified twentyfive year sentence with fifteen years fixed. (R., pp.63-64.) On the conspiracy to
commit felony escape charge, the district court imposed an indeterminate fiveyear sentence. (Tr., p.57, Ls.10-14.) Lamb timely appealed. (R., pp.65-69.)
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ISSUES
Lamb states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it
imposed an excessive unified sentence of twenty-five years,
with fifteen year fixed, upon Mr. Lamb following his plea of
guilty to Lewd Conduct?

2.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it
failed to require a mental health evaluation of Mr. Lamb for
sentencing?

(Appellant's brief, p.6)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Lamb failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

2.

Has Lamb failed to show that it would be appropriate for this Court to
reach his claim of error in the lack of a psychological evaluation, raised for
the first time on appeal, after Lamb declined such an evaluation in the trial
court?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Lamb Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Lamb asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed

a unified sentence of 25 years with 15 years fixed upon his conviction for lewd
and lascivious conduct with a minor under 16. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-19.) Lamb
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, considering the objectives of
sentencing, the nature of his crime, the impact of the crime on his victim, and the
significant danger Lamb poses to the community.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion,

the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish
that the sentence is excessive, Lamb must demonstrate that reasonable minds
could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the sentencing
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goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

!ft

Idaho

appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980
P.2d 552 (1999).
In this case, the district court referenced and discussed the appropriate
sentencing factors.

(Tr., p.53, Ls.9-18.)

The court also expressly and

methodically considered I.C. § 19-2521 and its enumerated criteria for
determining whether to place a defendant on probation or impose imprisonment.
(Tr., p.49, L.1 -

p.53, L.8.)

The court reviewed and discussed Lamb's

presentence investigation report, his psychosexual assessment and evaluation,
his substance abuse evaluation, and letters submitted in support of Lamb by his
family.

(Tr., p.50, Ls.15-18; p.53, L.19 - p.56, L.13.)

The court referenced

potential mitigating factors including Lamb's profession of remorse during the
sentencing hearing and significant family support.

(Tr., p.54, Ls.10-17; p.58,

Ls.18-24.) The district court was primarily and appropriately concerned with the
safety of the community, and recognized that Lamb posed a significant safety
risk. (Tr., p.49, Ls.9-11; p.52, L.24 - p.53, L.5; p.56, Ls.8-23.)
The facts of this case warrant the sentence imposed.

Lamb utilized a

position of trust and authority to sexually abuse his step-daughter. This abuse
was prolonged, frequent, and occurred over A.K.'s formative years. The abuse
resulted in A.K.'s pregnancy and subsequent abortion.
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(PSI, p.10.) A.K. has

undergone counseling where she continues to make disclosures regarding the
extent of the abuse. (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-16.)

Further, the district court recognized

indications that A.K. "is perhaps cognitively delayed or socially delayed," which
"makes her even more vulnerable to threats and risk of manipulation." (Tr., p.56,
Ls.18-23.)
While Lamb does not have a significant prior criminal history, he did
demonstrate his willingness to engage in additional criminal activity after his
arrest in the present case. While detained in the county jail following his arrest
for lewd and lascivious conduct, Lamb conspired with other inmates to violently
attack a deputy and escape from the jail. (PSI, pp.2-3.) In preparation for the
escape attempt, Lamb took the steps to unscrew a loose shower head, wrap it in
a towel, take it to his cell, and show it to the other conspiring inmates. (CCSO
supplemental report, p.7.)

Lamb's near-immediate regression into criminal

thinking and behavior when placed in the structured environment of county jail
does not speak well of his potential prospects on community supervision or a
retained jurisdiction program.
In addition, a review of the information from the presentence investigation
and evaluations supports the district court's concern for the safety of the
community. The presentence investigator noted that while Lamb acknowledged
the wrongness of his conduct, "[h]e did not seem to express serious concern or
remorse and failed to take responsibility for his actions." (PSI, p.10.) The PSI
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continued that "Lamb maintains that the victim 'asked' for it," and that "Lamb
continues to bad-mouth his wife and seems to be putting great effort into putting
the negative focus on her and taking it off himself." (Id.)
The psychosexual evaluator recognized Lamb's "most relevant issues and
dynamic factors" that contributed to his crime as:
[S]exual attraction to prepubescent children, attitudes that support
child molestation, sexual entitlement, negative mood, lack of
recognition of risk to re-offend, attitudes that support antisocial
behavior, insufficient fear of consequences, callousness, sexual
preoccupation, beliefs that support the manipulation of others, poor
impulse control, and poor emotional regulation.
(Psychosexual evaluation, p.1 1 .)
In identifying the "most likely type of future victim," the psychosexual
evaluator noted that Lamb "seemed most prone towards sexually offending
against prepubescent or adolescent females," and "appeared most likely to act in
an opportunistic or moderately predatory way, targeting individuals who were
willing participants, sexually curious, easily manipulated, or overcome by force."
(Id., p.2.)

Lamb's propensities thus endanger the type of individual that he

victimized in this case, one with whom Lamb was able to perpetrate his abuse
over a period of time without detection. The character of this abuse, and of the
victim, was such that the abuse was only revealed upon A.K.'s pregnancy.

1

The state cites the "psychosexual evaluation" conducted by Mountain States
Counseling & Psychological Services distinctly from the "social/sexual
assessment" conducted by SANE Solutions.
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The psychosexual evaluator concluded that Lamb was a moderate risk to
re-offend, but specifically noted that had it not been for Lamb's low STATIC-99
score - a metric which relied on factors such as Lamb's age, lack of criminal
history, and history of living with a romantic partner - Lamb would have been
more seriously considered for classification as a high risk to re-offend. (Id., pp.1,
12-13.)
The fact that Lamb believes the district court should have imposed a
lesser sentence does not establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.
Because Lamb has failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing
discretion, he is not entitled to relief.

11.
Lamb Has Failed To Show That It Would Be Appropriate For This Court To
Reach His Claim Of Error In The Lack Of A Psychological Evaluation, Raised For
The First Time On Appeal, After Lamb Declined Such An Evaluation In The Trial
Court
A.

Introduction
Lamb contends that the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a

psychological evaluation prior to his sentencing.

(Appellant's brief, pp.19-23.)

However, by specifically declining the opportunity for the court to order a
psychological evaluation, Lamb is precluded from raising the issue on appeal by
the doctrine of invited error. Lamb also failed to preserve the issue for appeal.
Further, even if this Court considers this claim of error on appeal, Lamb has
failed to show the district court erred because the record supports a ·finding that
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there was no reason to believe Lamb's mental condition would be a significant
factor at sentencing, and the information before the court was adequate to satisfy
the relevant statutory criteria.

B.

Lamb's Claim Of Error Is Barred By The Invited Error Doctrine
Lamb's claim of error in the lack of a psychological evaluation is barred

because any error was invited. "The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a
party from asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the
commission of the error." State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88
(Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657
{Ct. App. 1993)). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party
who "caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court" to take a
particular action from "later challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake,
133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). "One may not complain of errors
one has consented to or acquiesced in." Norton, 151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at
88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State
v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). The invited
error doctrine applies to sentencing decisions, as well as to rulings made during
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462,465, 788 P.2d 863,866 (Ct. App. 1990).
At the change of plea hearing, the district court ordered a presentence
investigation report and a psychosexual evaluation.

(Tr., p.26, Ls.8-10.) The

court then asked Lamb's counsel if any other evaluations would be appropriate.
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(Tr., p.26, Ls.10-11.)

Lamb's counsel responded: "I think a mental health

evaluation would be covered by the psychosexual evaluation.

My client's

indicated he's had problems with substances in the past. I would ask the court to
order a 19-2524 substance evaluation as well." (Tr., p.26, Ls.12-17.) The district
court ordered a substance abuse evaluation, and one was completed prior to
sentencing. (Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.1; Substance abuse evaluation.) Having
specifically indicated that no psychological evaluation was needed, Lamb is
estopped from asserting the district court erred by not ordering such an
evaluation prior to his sentencing.
Because Lamb declined the opportunity to participate in a psychological
evaluation, and because he indicated that such an evaluation was unnecessary,
Lamb is estopped from raising this claim of error on appeal.

C.

Lamb Failed To Preserve His Claim Of Error
Even if he is not precluded from raising this claim by virtue by the invited

error doctrine, this Court should not consider Lamb's claim of because it is not
preserved. 2 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "when an error has not

2

The state recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently rejected the
state's argument that the Perry fundamental error analysis applies to a
defendant's failure to object to a district court's decision not to sua sponte order a
psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. State v. Clinton, 2012 Opinion No.
43, Docket No. 38755 (Idaho App., August 20, 2012), petition for review granted
November 7, 2012. However, the Idaho Supreme Court recently granted the
parties' petitions for review in that case.
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been properly preserved for appeal through objection at trial, the appellate
court's authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the
error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment
due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Thus, "where an error has occurred at trial and
was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall only be
reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an appellate court that one of his
unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated."

kl at 226,

245 P.3d at 978

(emphasis added).
Lamb did not preserve his appellate claim below and does not attempt to
demonstrate fundamental error in this appeal.

Any effort to establish

fundamental error would be doomed to failure because there is no constitutional
right to a court-ordered psychological evaluation for sentencing. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (first prong of fundamental error analysis requires
appellant to show that his "unwaived constitutional rights were violated").
Because Lamb's appellate claim of error was not preserved and has not been
shown to be fundamental error, this Court cannot review it

D.

Even if The District Court's Decision Not To Sua Sponte Overrule Lamb's
Wishes And Order A Psychological Evaluation Were Reviewable On
Appeal, Lamb Has Failed To Show Error
Idaho Code § 19-2522(1) states that "[i]f there is reason to believe the

mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for
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good cause shown," the court shall appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to
evaluate and report upon the defendant's mental condition to inform the court's
sentencing decision.

The legislature's purpose behind giving trial courts the

ability to order a mental health examination prior to sentencing is to "broaden[ ] a
court's sentencing options related to the treatment for substance abuse or mental
health issues." State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 732, 249 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Ct.
App. 2011) (citing Statement of Purpose, SB 1149 (2007)).
Idaho Code § 19-2522(3) also states that, should a psychological
evaluation be ordered, the accompanying report must include the following:
(a)

A description of the nature of the examination;

(b)

A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition
of the defendant;

(c)

An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect
and level of functional impairment;

(d)

A consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition;

(e)

An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;

(f)

A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant
may create for the public if at large.

1.C. § 19-2522(3).
However, "[a] psychological evaluation is not required in every case where
the defendant claims some mental illness or disability." State v. Jockumsen, 148
Idaho 817, 822, 229 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2010). "Rather, the decision of
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whether to obtain a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing court's
discretion."

kt

(citing I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195

P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189, 45 P.3d 844,
845 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct.
App. 1999)).
"As with any discretionary determination, however, the district court1s
action must be consistent with the applicable legal standards." State v.
McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). "A district
court's election not to order a psychological evaluation will be upheld on appeal if
the record can support a finding that there was no reason to believe a
defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing or if the
information already before the court adequately met the requirements of I.C. §
19-2522(3)." Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d at 1184 (emphasis added,
citations omitted). In this case, the record supports a finding that there was no
reason to believe Lamb's mental condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing, and that evaluations and other information already before the court
adequately met the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3).
Lamb's mental condition was not a significant factor at sentencing
because it was not a "key underlying factor in [his] commission of the crime." See
State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288, 233 P.3d 732, 735 (Ct. App. 2010)
("[aJlthough not exclusive, a defendant's mental condition can be a significant
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factor at sentencing when that condition may be a key underlying factor in the
defendant's commission of the crime, especially when the actions are a serious
departure from the defendant's history and character"). There is no indication in
the record that Lamb's mental health was a key underlying factor in his lewd and
lascivious conduct.

Instead, the narrative presented by the evaluators, and

discussed by the district court and Lamb's counsel at the sentencing hearing,
revolved around riis lifetime of substance abuse and his sexual proclivity towards
minors. (See generally psychosexual evaluation and social/sexual assessment;
see generally substance abuse evaluation; Tr., p.32, L.21 - p.37, L.9; p.48, L.23
- p.56, L.23.)

Lamb himself denied any history of mental health issues to the

psychosexual evaluator, and reported to the substance abuse evaluator that he
had not been diagnosed by a doctor, nurse, or counselor with a mental,
emotional, or psychological problem, and had never received treatment for any
mental,

emotional,

behavioral,

or psychological

problem.

(Social/sexual

assessment, p.3; substance abuse evaluation p.7.)
As Lamb points out on appeal (Appellant's brief, p.22), the district court
made specific reference to Lamb's "personality issues" that were identified by the
psychosexual evaluator, including his social difficulties, attitudes that support
antisocial behavior, insufficient fear of consequences, callousness, and poor
impulse control.

(Tr., p.55, Ls.3-10.) However, these personality traits, which

are likely quite common in sex offenders, do not compel a district court to order a
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separate, dedicated, psychological evaluation in addition to a psychosexual
evaluation. On appeal, Lamb has cited no evidence or history of mental health
issues aside from that which was identified and discussed by the psychosexual
evaluator.
Furthermore, even assuming that Lamb's mental health issues were a
significant factor at sentencing, the district court had ample evidence regarding
his mental condition and the I.C. § 19-2522(3) criteria as they related to the
underlying crime in this case. The substance abuse evaluator measured Lamb's
mental condition on the Internal Mental Distress Scale, Behavior Complexity
Scale, and Cognitive Impairment Screen. (Substance abuse evaluation, pp.5-7.)
The psychosexual evaluation discussed Lamb's identified "personality issues" in
the context of his offense, criminal sexual proclivities, amenability to treatment,
risk for re-offense, and the evaluator's treatment recommendations.

(See

generally, psychosexual evaluation and social/sexual assessment.)

The

information contained within the evaluations available to the court were more
than adequate to meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.
There was no reason to believe Lamb's mental health would be a
significant factor at sentencing, and the district court had access to adequate
information about Lamb's mental health through the existing evaluations and
other information. Therefore, Lamb has failed to show that the district court
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abused its discretion in failing to override his wishes and sua sponte order a
separate psychological evaluation.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Lamb's sentence and
judgment of conviction.
DATED this 14th day of January 2013.

For:
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